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High levels of inflation characterised many emerging economies at the beginning of 
the nineties. As a result different mechanisms to aim at reduce inflation were set in 
place. In this respect, a variety of monetary policy frameworks have been suggested. 
Three options are the most studied ones; the exchange rate regime, the monetary 
regime and the inflation-targeting regime (see Mishkin, 1997). Inflation targeting (IT) 
however has become increasingly popular in emerging economies where its 
implementation has enhanced monetary policy credibility. There is a greater weight 
on inflation control and more willingness to vary interest rates according to inflation 
expectations (see Schaechter et al., 2000).   
 
Countries such as Brazil in 1999, Chile in 1990, the Czech Republic in 1997, Israel in 
1991, Mexico in 1994, and South Africa in 2000 have adopted inflation targeting. The 
success of these emerging economies in reducing inflation along with IT principles, 
has generated an increased interested in ‘feedback rules’ for these countries (see 
Mohanty and Klau, 2004). These rules link short-term interest rates controlled by the 
central bank to the rate of inflation and/or its deviation from the targeted rate. Several 
studies focus mainly on either individual countries or regional experiences (see 
Amato and Gerlach, 2002; Corbo, 2002; Bar-Or and Leiderman, 2000). Nonetheless, 
little attention has been paid to the comparability of emerging countries with similar 
experiences in their interest rate setting behaviour and whether consistency is 
achieved or not by incorporating additional variables to the traditional central bank 
reaction function. Corbo (2002) finds that, in setting their interest rates emerging 
economies tend to look beyond inflation and focus on other objectives as well. 
Moreover there is no consensus regarding the importance of IT and its main 
requirements at the time this framework has been adopted in these countries. Different 
criteria are observed as regards the main prerequisites that should be considered at the 
time IT is adopted (see Agenor, 2000; Schaechter et al., 2000; Masson, et a., 1997). 
The present study analyses the process through which interest rates have been 
determined in two emerging economies – Israel and Mexico – through the 
implementation of similar procedures to achieve lower and more stable levels of 
inflation. The main results suggest that when setting monetary policy, central banks in   3
these countries look beyond just inflation, taking into account other variables such as 
foreign reserves. Specially, movements in the exchange rate seem to play an 
important role especially in the case of Israel where there is not a clear commitment to 
price stability. This involves the introduction of inflation targeting principles along 
with policies based on fixed or managed exchanges rates.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 examines how monetary 
policy has been conducted in the two emerging economies. Section 3 introduces the 
idea of monetary policy rules, specifies a baseline interest rate rule and describes the 
estimation procedure. Then, section 4 presents the empirical results and the final 
section concludes.    
 
2. The practice of Monetary Policy in Emerging Economies 
 
We can use the term ‘monetary policy system’, to denote some coherent framework 
for making monetary policy decisions and for explaining them to the public. In recent 
years, several emerging economies have been forced to adopt more flexible exchange 
rates as a consequence of serious financial or currency crises. Therefore, they have 
had to find a different nominal anchor to guide domestic monetary policy over the 
medium and long term. As a result, some of these countries have introduced inflation 
targets and since then they have followed successful strategies for disinflation during 
the transition towards a fully-fledged IT regime.
1 Bearing this in mind this section 
reviews the progress made by two emerging economies, Israel and Mexico, which 
have followed similar procedures to achieve moderate levels of inflation and where 
the adoption of IT principles seem to be the most important aspect. Israel is a good 
example of how IT has been adopted during a process of disinflation along with a 
crawling exchange rate band. On the other hand, Mexico has been considered as one 
of the few cases of a Latin American country moving towards the floating exchange 
rate regime in conjunction with an implicit inflation target system. The stance 
regarding the exchange rate policy emerges as the most importance difference. This 
issue has been considered essential not only in the case of emerging economies but 
also as one of the main requirements to successfully implement IT.  
                                                 
1 This seems not to be the case for industrialised countries where disinflation had largely been 
completed by the time of  the IT adoption.   4
 
It is important to note that although more emerging economies have recently 
introduced IT principles (see Fig. 1) their short experience constitutes a restriction to 
carry out reliable econometric analysis. Nonetheless, the experience of Israel and 
Mexico may be considered as pioneering cases for emerging economies in their effort 
to reduce high levels of inflation.
 2 Furthermore, the different posture concerning the 
exchange rate policy in these two countries constitutes an interesting issue to be 
analysed. The following sections briefly introduce how monetary policy has been 
recently conducted in the two selected countries in their effort to reduce inflation.   
 
 
Figure 1.  
Inflation rate at adoption of IT in Emerging Economies 



































































































After nearly a decade of sluggish economic activity and high inflation, the Mexican 
economic authorities liberalised the trade sector in 1985, adopted an economic 
stabilisation programme, known as the ‘Pacto’ at the end of 1987, and gradually 
introduced market-oriented institutions. At the beginning of 1988, the nominal 
exchange rate was fixed and became the main anchor of the anti-inflationary policy. 
                                                 
2 Chile is considered as the first emerging economy that announced inflation targets in 1990. Chile’s 
experience however has been the most thoroughly studied and its implementation relies more from the 
practice of developed countries.      5
Nevertheless, the vulnerabilities accumulated during this process – years of large 
capital inflows and financial liberalisation – plus the negative external and domestic 
shocks faced by the economy during 1994, led to the currency and financial crisis of 
December 1994. The central bank, under severe pressure in the foreign exchange rate 
market, decided to let the peso float (Gil-Diaz and Carstens, 1996).  
 
Several measures were implemented during 1995. To contain the inflationary effects 
of the devaluation, a tight monetary policy was adopted. To restore the credibility of 
the Bank of Mexico, the authorities reiterated publicly that the primary objective of its 
monetary policy was to stop the inflationary effects of the peso depreciation and to 
rapidly bring down inflation to moderate levels. The bank also committed to increased 
transparency of its own actions by making available more timely information on its 
balance sheets as well as other monetary and fiscal indicators. Following the measures 
taken by the government, the peso became more stable, interest rates began to fall, 
economic activity recovered rapidly and inflation came down to manageable levels. 
Inflation declined from 51.7 percent in 1995 to 12.3% in 1999 and the central bank 
announced, for the firs time, a 10% inflation target for the year 2000 before the 
Ministry of Finance submitted to the Congress the economic programme for the year 
(see Fig. 2). This move contributed to the increase of accountability of the central 
bank regarding its inflation objectives. In addition, the Bank of Mexico started 
publishing inflation reports in 2000. After the implementation of these measures it can 
be said that Mexico has moved to a fully-fledged IT regime (see Corbo and Schmidt-




Inflationary developments in Israel are closely linked to exchange rate policy and 
demand pressure. At the beginning of the 1980s, the rate of inflation rose persistently 
and at increasing rate, reaching three-digit levels. This continued until mid-1985, 
when the Economic Stabilization Programme (ESP) was introduced. The principal 
role of monetary policy under the ESP was to defend the exchange rate policy 
(Haldane, 1995). The exchange rate against the dollar was set as the nominal anchor 
for prices. Nevertheless, the Israeli currency (shekel) was devaluated several times 
between 1986 and 1991. In March 1990, the width of the band was increased to ± 5   6
percent and in December 1991 the horizontal band was replaced by a crawling-band 
regime.
 The crawling-band regime was intended to reduce uncertainty with regard to 
the development of the real exchange rate, in order both to benefit the business sector 
and to reduce speculative capital movements. Since then, the width of the exchange 
rate band has been increased on several occasions and the focus of monetary policy 
has shifted toward inflation targeting (Leiderman and Bufman, 2000).
 3  
 
An explicit medium-term orientation for monetary policy was established in 1996 
when the government announced a long-term objective to bring inflation down to the 
average rate of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries by 2001. In 1999, the Ministry of Finance announced two-year 
targets of 3-4 percent for 2000 and 2001. The Bank of Israel only recently started 
publishing semi-annual inflation reports (March 1998), but it refrains from making 
explicit quantitative inflation forecasting. Overall, Israel’s experience with inflation 
targeting can be broadly considered a success. With the exception of the large 
overshooting of the inflation target in 1994, since 1992 the inflation targets have 
either been met or have been exceeded by less than 1 percent. Furthermore, the shekel 
has been consistently hitting the lower (stronger) end of its crawling band. In short, 
Israeli inflation targeting provides a important example of how monetary policy can 
be made more flexible with no apparent loss of credibility and effectiveness.  
 
In sum, the conduct of monetary policy in these two countries suggests that inflation 
targeting can become a successful medium-term strategy for monetary policy in 
emerging economies (see Fig. 2). At initial stages while credibility was being built 
and inflation was being gradually reduced, there was a transition period where the 
inflation target was not explicit and was usually stated as achieving a gradual 
reduction of inflation towards industrial countries’ levels. Once enough progress was 
made in reducing inflation, these countries started to use explicit targets publicly 
announced at the end of the previous year. They adopted IT as a means of balancing 
the uncertainties of their external economic environment, particularly the behaviour of 
the exchange rate, with the need to anchor the public’s inflation expectations. Israel 
opted for a crawling exchange rate band which has been gradually widened and 
                                                 
3 The mid-point rate is adjusted on a daily basis according to a present gradient, determined by the gap 
between Israel’s inflation target and expected inflation in its trading partners.   7
Mexico was forced to adopt a floating exchange rate as a result of a severe pressure 
on its currency.  
 
Figure 2. 
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The role of the exchange rate under IT has been a debatable issue. A country that 
chooses a fixed exchange rate system subordinates its monetary policy to the 
exchange rate objective and consequently monetary policy just supports that rate. 
Under a floating exchange rate, on the other hand, monetary policy is not constrained 
by any rule. In other words, monetary policy serves as nominal anchor of the   8
economy. In theory an exchange rate target could coexist with an inflation target so 
long as the monetary authorities make clear that the latter objective has priority if a 
conflict arises (Masson, Savastano and Sharma, 1998). In this respect, the analysis of 
interest rate rules to evaluate the main determinants of monetary policy in these two 
countries seems to be an appropriate approach to evaluate not only the role of the 
exchange rate but also additional variables that may influence the stance of the 
monetary policy setting interest rates. The following section introduces and discusses 
in more detail this procedure.  
 
3.  Monetary policy rules: Statistical framework and data 
 
Commonly, monetary policy analysis has been approached in two ways. The first one 
requires an understanding of the mechanisms through which monetary policy affects 
the economy. In other words, monetary authorities must have a precise assessment of 
the timing and effect of their policies on the economy. This transmission mechanism 
includes interest rate, exchange rate and other asset price effects, and the so-called 
credit channel. The second approach, on the other hand, evaluates the conditions 
under which monetary authorities react to change their monetary policy. This idea can 
be summarized in terms of a policy reaction function that indicates how policy will 
react to the shocks and contingencies that will inevitably hit the economy (see 
Cecchetti, 1998). The success of many countries in reducing inflation, together with 
the adoption of formal inflation targets by a growing number of central banks, has 
generated an increased interest in this kind of ‘feedback rules’ for IT. Policy rules are 
seen as a guide according to which discretion should be used. Amato and Gerlach 
(2002), for example, evaluate IT in emerging and transition economies finding that an 
important distinguishing feature of inflation targeting is that it leads to a more 
systematic interest rate response by the central bank to inflation. To analyse the main 
determinants of monetary policy, this study focuses on the latter approach.  
 
3.1. Baseline specification 
 
Two types of rules have been the most studied ones in recent empirical work: (1) The 
inflation-forecast-based rule, and the (2) Taylor rule, which is by far the most popular 
and the one this study is based on. Rules based on inflation forecasts make the change   9
in the policy instrument a function of the deviation of a conditional forecast of 
inflation in some future period from the target rate of inflation, as follows:  
 
*] ) ( [ 1 π π γ α − + = + − k t t t t E r r                         (1) 
 
The conditional inflation forecast serves as a feedback variable, and the inflation 
target dictates the necessary degree of instrument adjustment. This rule allows policy-
makers to adjust the horizon of the inflation forecast, depending on the length of the 
transmission lag for monetary policy and it uses all relevant-information for the 
prediction of inflation
4. Nevertheless, there are potential difficulties such as the risk of 
indeterminacy and the inability to distinguish between demand and inflation shocks. 
Taylor (1993), on the other hand, proposed a feedback policy of the following form:
 5 
 
*) )( 1 ( *) ( * y y r r t t t − − + − + = α π π α        0< α < 1           (2) 
 
where 
* r is the long run equilibrium real interest rate,  * π is the target inflation rate 
and y* is the potential output. This rule indicates that when the economy is in 
equilibrium, that is, when the inflation rate is equal to its target rate and output is 
equal to potential, the real interest rate is also in equilibrium. Taylor’s rule says that 
the central bank should raise the interest rate when inflation and output rise above 
their target levels, with the inflation response being somewhat greater than the output 
response. Conversely, when inflation or output falls bellow its target, the central bank 
should reduce interest rates.  
 
The theoretical foundations of the rule proposed by Taylor has been formalised by 
several authors. Svensson (1997), Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2001), for 
instance, have shown that approximations to this rule can be obtained from an 
optimization process where the central bank minimises a quadratic loss function in 
inflation deviations from its target and the output gap, subject to a standard New 
Keynesian macroeconomic framework.  In particular, this study follows the work 
                                                 
4 The inflation-forecast-based rule is different from the Svensson’s inflation-targeting rule. Svensson 
argues that the central bank should use an inflation forecast as an explicit intermediate policy target. 
Moreover, Svensson’s approach requires that the central bank solve an optimal-control problem.  
5 For a more detailed analysis of the historical evolution of monetary policy rules and their 
implications, see Taylor (1999).    10
done by Clarida et al. (1999, 1998) where the authors postulate a forward-looking 
version of the rule proposed by Taylor.  Specifically,  
 
[ [ ] ) | ( *)] ) | (
* *
k t t k t t n t t y y E E r r + + + − Ω ⋅ + − Ω ⋅ + = γ π π β                    (3) 
 
wherer denotes the long run equilibrium nominal interest rate
6,  n t+ π  indicates the 
percent change in the price level between periods t and t+n (expressed in annual rates) 
and yt is real output. The variable 
* r is the interest rate set by the central bank; 
*
t π is 
the target for inflation and 
*
t y  is given by potential output, defined as the level that 
would arise if wages and prices were perfectly flexible. In addition, E is the 
expectation operator and Ω is the information available to the central bank at the time 
it sets interest rates.
 7   
 
The policy rule given by eq. (3) has some applications in both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. Empirically, this reaction function offers a reasonable good 
description of the way major central banks have performed recently. Clarida et al. 
(1998), for instance, estimate various reactions function to evaluate monetary policy 
in Europe. They applied a forward-looking version of the Taylor rule, which provides 
evidence to support that their baseline forward-looking specification works quite well 
against various alternatives. Clarida, et al. (2000), estimate a forward-looking 
monetary policy reaction function for the postwar US economy and consider how this 
rule evolved over time. In particular, interest rate policy in the Volcker-Greenspan 
period appears to have been much more sensitive to changes in expected inflation 
than in the pre-Volcker period. Few studies can be found in the case of emerging 
economies. Mohanty and Klau (2004) for example, evaluates central banks’ interest 
rate setting behaviour in a group of emerging economies. They found that in most of 
these countries the interest rate responds strongly to the exchange rate and in some 
cases the response was higher than to changes in the inflation rate or the output gap. 
Another study by Corbo (2000) which estimates reaction functions in terms of 
forward-looking rules for six Latin American countries showed that just Chile uses 
                                                 
6 By construction it is the desired nominal rate when both inflation and output are at their target levels.  
7 It is highly possible that when chosen the target interest rate, the central bank may not have direct 
information about the current values of either output or the price level. The specification proposed by 
Clarida et al. (1998) allows for this possibility.    11
monetary policy with a clear commitment to achieve the target inflation.
8  
Theoretically, policy implications given by eq. (3) for the cyclical behaviour of the 
economy will depend on the sign and magnitude of the slope coefficients, β and γ. To 
illustrate the basic intuition, consider the implied target for the real interest rate, 
*
t rr , 
given by: 
 




k t t k t t k t t y y E E r r rr + + − Ω ⋅ + − Ω ⋅ − + = γ π π β         (4) 
 
where  ) | ( ,
*
t k t t t E r rr Ω − ≡ π and 
* * π − ≡ r r r is the long run equilibrium real rate. It is 
assumed that the real rate is stationary and is determined by non-monetary factors in 
the long run. As a result,  r r  is a constant and is independent of monetary policy
9. As 
eq. (4) makes clear the sign of the response of the real rate target to changes in 
expected inflation and the output gap depends on whether β is greater or less than one 
and on the sign of γ, respectively. To the extent that lower real rates stimulate 
economic activity and inflation, interest rate rules characterized by β>1 will tend to be 
stabilizing while those with β≤1  are likely to be destabilizing or, at best, 
accommodative of shocks to the economy
10. Thus, the coefficient β turns out to be a 
key parameter at the moment of assessing central bank’s response. If a monetary 
policy rule like eq. (4) with β > 1 offers a good approximation to the process through 
which interest rates are determined, then monetary policy works as an automatic 
stabiliser of inflation around its target. In other words, monetary policy plays the role 
of being a nominal anchor for the economy. In the same sense when a rule like eq. (4) 
with γ>0 offers a good approximation to the process through which interest rates are 
determined, monetary policy is said to be an automatic stabilizer of output around its 
potential level. In addition, this specification allows the control of inflation and the 
stabilisation of output to be identified as independent objectives
11 and considers all 
the information available at the time the central bank set interest rates.   
                                                 
8 The rest of the countries are:  Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru. 
9 If the analysis is carried out among different sub periods there exists the possibility of having shifts 
over time in the long-run equilibrium rate. Therefore, the real interest rate is constant only within the 
sub period estimated.  
10 In this case although the central bank raises the nominal interest rate in response to a rise in 
inflation, it does not increase it sufficiently to keep the real rate from declining. 
11 In the traditional Taylor rule model, for example, the central bank reacts to lag inflation as opposed 
to expected inflation. Then it is not clear if the central bank can respond independently to inflation and 
the output gap.   12
 
Interest rate smoothing   
 
The policy reaction function given by eq. (3) assumes an immediate adjustment of the 
actual interest rate  to its target level. In other words, it does not allow for any 
uncertainty in policy actions other than that associated with incorrect forecasts of the 
economy. It also assumes that the monetary authorities have perfect control over 
interest rates. Central banks, however, adjust interest rates more cautiously towards its 
desired level than standard models predict (Goodfriend, 1991). To allow for this 
possibility, a partial adjustment equation is considered.
 12 In particular, Clarida et al. 
(2000,1998), proposed the following relationship for the actual interest rate,  t r :   
 
rt =  t t t r L r υ ρ ρ + ⋅ + ⋅ − −1
* ) ( ) 1 (                    ( 5 )
  
where the parameter ρ∈(0,1) reflects the degree of lagged dependence on the interest 
rate or the degree of interest rate smoothing. The specification also includes an 
exogenous random shock to the interest rate, υt that it is assumed to be iid (0,1). The 
interest rate target 
*
t r  is given by eq. (3). Particularly, each period the central bank 
adjusts the interest rate to eliminate a fraction (1-ρ) of the gap between its current 
target level and its past value. In addition, to obtain an estimable equation the authors 
define: 
* βπ α − ≡ r  and
*
t t t y y x − ≡ . Then combining the partial adjustment eq. (5) 
with the target model (3) yields the following policy reaction function: 
 
t t t n t t r x E E r υ ρ γ π β α ρ + ⋅ + Ω ⋅ + Ω ⋅ + ⋅ − = − + 1 ]} | [ ] | [ { ) 1 (         (6) 
 
Finally, assuming that expectations are rational expected values are replaced by 
realised values in order to obtain the following equation: 
 
t t t n t t r x r ε ρ γ ρ π β ρ α ρ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ − = − + 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (     (7) 
 
                                                 
12 Other explanations for slow adjustment of interest rates include fear of disrupting financial markets 
and disagreement among policy-makers.    13
where  t t t n t n t t x E x E υ γ π π β ρ ε + Ω − ⋅ + Ω − ⋅ ⋅ − − ≡ + + ])} | [ ( ]) | [ ( { ) 1 (  is a linear 
combination of the forecast errors of inflation and output and the true disturbance υt. 
 
3.2. Estimation technique 
 
The estimation of eq. (6) is not straightforward as some of the variables considered in 
the right hand side of the equation may be endogenous. Moreover misspecification 
errors may be expected. These difficulties invalidate conventional least squares 
standard errors since the cov (πt,εt) ≠ 0 and/or cov(xt, εt) ≠ 0. To obtain unbiased and 
consistent estimators the model is estimated using the General Method of Moments 
(GMM).
 13  In this respect, let Ut symbolize a vector of instruments known when rt is 
set. Suitable instruments include any lagged variables that help forecast inflation and 
output, as well as any contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the 
current interest rate shock υt. These strategy implies a set of orthogonality conditions, 
which provide the basis for the estimation of the parameter vector (α,β,γ,ρ) that are 
given by E[εt | Ut] = 0. Combining this condition with eq. (7) gives us the explicit set 
of restrictions used by GMM:  
 
0 ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ 1 = ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ − − − + t t t n t t U i x i E ρ γ ρ π β ρ α ρ                        (8) 
 
It should be emphasized that GMM naturally provides a suitable econometric 
framework for testing the validity of the model (see Hansen and West, 2002; 
Jagannathan et al., 2002). When the number of instruments is larger than the number 
of parameters to be estimated, the model is said to be over identified. In this case, 




So far, the discussion has not considered the inclusion of additional variables to the 
baseline equation. In practice, the output gap and inflation are not the only relevant 
objectives from a practical point of view. Ball (1999) and Svensson (2000) for 
instance argue that monetary policy rules should take into account other variables 
                                                 
13 For a detailed description of this method see Greene (2000) and Enders (1995).   14
such as foreign interest rates or the exchange rate which might reflect uncertainties 
about future inflation faster than expected inflation or the expected output gap
14. In 
addition, some central banks in emerging economies, such as the central bank of 
Chile, Czech Republic and Israel have a formal objective with regard to currency 
stability. It is therefore useful to examine the consequences for monetary policy of 
introducing additional variables in the policy makers’ objective function. To this end 
a number of simple alternatives to the baseline model are considered. Let zt denote a 
variable other than inflation or output that may potentially influence rate setting 
(independently of its use for forecasting). For each alternative specification, the 
following equation is utilised:  
 
t t j t j t k t n t n t t r z z x r ε ρ ϕ γ π π β α ρ + ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ − = − + + + + + 1
* * ]} [ ] [ ] [ { ) 1 (     (9) 
 
The alternative model is then estimated in the same way as in the baseline model. This 
specification allows us to evaluate whether the direct effect of zt on policy is 
quantitatively important. Additional variables commonly consist of changes in the 
nominal exchange rate, money, foreign interest rates or any other variable, which may 
have influence in the process through which interest rates are determined. The 
variables included in this study are changes in nominal exchange rates and money 
supply, foreign reserves, a lending boom indicator and the current account.
15 The 
change in prices over the previous year is also considered in order to get a direct test 
of the forward-looking specification versus the ‘backward-looking’ one. We examine 
each of these variables below.   
 
It is plausible to expect that a variable that would be important in the context of small 
open economies would be the exchange rate.
 16 Recent work by Ball (1999) and 
Svensson (2002) on small open economies models has examined the role of the 
                                                 
14 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) however present a small, open-economy model in which the effect 
of the exchange rate on output and inflation is captured in the parameters of the policy rule. The 
difference is in the quantitative response (magnitude of the parameters β and γ) of interest rate to 
expected inflation and the output gap. The intuition behind this argument is that if movements in the 
exchange rate will have an effect in inflation and/or output, then these effects should be captured by 
changes in the expected deviation of inflation from its target and in the expected output gap.    
15 Choosing the variables that could have played a role when setting monetary policy, we draw on the 
work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996, 1997) on the economic indicators for banking and currency 
crises.  
16 When the pass-through of the exchange rate into prices is high, the exchange rate is likely to assume 
special importance for monetary policy.   15
exchange rate in monetary policy rules explicitly. Their results highlight the idea that 
a depreciation of the currency calls for an increase in the interest rate
17. On the other 
hand, Taylor (2001) argued that although the exchange rate is important, particularly 
in emerging economies, any reaction of the interest rate to this variable would be 
indirect, through its effect on inflation and the output gap. Additionally, central banks 
may react to changes in the exchange rate to maintain financial stability rather than 
price stability. In this respect, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) for instance, attribute such 
‘fear of floating’ behaviour to the high-risk premium they have to pay because of their 
low institutional and policy credibility.  
 
Central banks in emerging economies are also typically concerned with financial 
stability. Thus, three more variables are considered in the augmented interest rate rule 
as potential indicators for external crisis. The first one is foreign reserves. Many 
emerging economies affected by currency crises in the 1990s lost a large part of their 
foreign reserves trying to defend the value of their currencies and eventually, they had 
to abandon the fixed exchange rate (Kaminsky et al., 1997). Due to this reserve run-
down associated with the financial crisis, countries have been accumulating reserves 
even though they have adopted more flexible exchange rate regimes. This 
strengthening of reserves may be seen as a method of building up credibility and 
therefore may be related to the process of having more stability. Hence, incorporating 
foreign reserves in the reaction function of the central bank might result in a 
monitoring variable for emerging market economies regarding financial stability. The 
second variable is constructed as the ratio of the logarithm of the claims on private 
sector to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This ‘lending boom’ variable indicator has 
been mainly used to explain many banking crises, including Chile’s in 1982 and 
Mexico’s in 1994. During a boom, credit to the private sector increases rapidly 
making the banking sector more vulnerable (see Gourinchas et al. 2001). Moreover, it 
can be argued that the higher the ratio of this variable, the higher the potential of 
economic growth. Therefore more pressure on future inflation and consequently the 
need of raising interest rates. The third variable is the current account deficit. The 
current account is typically used as one of the main leading indicators for future 
behaviour of an economy and its importance has been mainly highlighted in emerging 
                                                 
17 The significant increase in the interest rates in Mexico after the currency depreciation at the end of 
1994 might be an example of such a reaction.    16
economies. Corbo (2002) for instance, finds that central banks in Latin America show 
an importance preference to stabilise current account deficits in the balance of 
payments even though this is not announced explicitly. It is worth mentioning that the 
addition of these variables constitutes mainly a shortcut to avoid a very complex 
model in which output and inflation may be affected by these factors. Table A1 in the 
appendix summarises various studies on monetary policy rules, which have extended 
the traditional version of the Taylor rule. These studies consider not only the 




The data are quarterly time series spanning the period 1982Q1-2001Q4 in the case of 
Mexico and the period 1988Q1-2001Q4 in the case of Israel. Data is mainly taken 
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-Rom regarding output, inflation, 
interest rates and foreign reserves and from the respective central bank’s websites.   
 
4. Empirical results 
 
The starting equation of the empirical analysis is:  
 
t t t n t t r x r ε ρ γ ρ π β ρ α ρ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ − = − + 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (                          (10) 
 
where β is the inflation coefficient  expected to be greater than one and γ the output 
gap coefficient expected to be greater than zero. The output gap is calculated using 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter and the Core Price Index (CPI) to calculate the rate of 
inflation.
 18 Three different specifications are considered. The first one uses actual 
values instead of expected of forecast ones (Baseline model). The main reason is the 
lack of reliable data for the entire sample period in the absence of official and 
                                                 
18 Following the literature, the most common method to construct an output gap series is based on the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. In this respect, potential output is determined as the output level that 
simultaneously minimises a weighted average of the gap between actual and potential output and the 
rate of change of the output trend. In addition to this method a linear and a quadratic trend are used to 
obtain alternative measures of the output gap. The series are constructed as the deviation of the natural 
logarithm of the real GDP from its potential value using the alternative methods. Alternative measures 
of inflation, on the other hand, are also taken into account. These include a measure of the core 
inflation, which excludes the relatively more volatile components of the CPI and the GDP deflator. The 
unemployment rate is also considered when available.    17
commonly accepted forecasts. In the second specification actual values of the 
explanatory variables are replaced by their deviations from trend values (Gap model). 
This is mainly because of the short experience of these countries with a fully-fledged 
IT and therefore with the lack of sufficient data for the announced inflation targets. 
The last specification includes data on inflation expectations available in each country 
(Forward-looking model). As it will be discuss later on this implies however the 
estimation of eq. (10) for a shorter sample period. The analysis is based on the 
primary assumption that within short samples all variables are stationary (see tables 
A2 and A3 in the appendix).  
 
4.1 The case of Mexico 
 
The Mexican experience is interesting for two reasons. First, it represents an emerging 
economy under a floating exchange rate regime that has been able to reduce inflation 
to one-digit levels. Second, the Mexican experience provides an interesting case of 
study for other developing countries considering the possibility of moving towards the 
floating exchange rate regime in conjunction IT principles. In other words, it is 
particularly interesting because the adoption of inflation targeting has been a useful 
mechanism for imposing discipline on monetary policy.   
 
4.1.1 Baseline specification 
 
To account for important monetary policy reforms a dummy variable is taken into 
consideration.  This dummy permits us to evaluate issues regarding structural stability 
without the need to break the sample up which would be problematic given the short 
sample period.
19 In the case of Mexico, the date selected considers the different 
measures implemented by the monetary authorities as a result of the currency and 
financial crisis at the end of 1994. These measures include central bank independence, 
the adoption of a floating exchange rate, the commitment to price stability and the 
                                                 
19 According to Clarida et al., 2000 the sample period must contain sufficient variation in inflation and 
output and must be sufficiently long in order to identify the slope of the coefficients in the policy 
reaction function. Chuecos (2003) and Corbo (2002), however estimate policy rules within short 
samples arguing sufficient variability in their estimations.   18
announcement for first time of inflation annual objectives.
 20 In this respect, the 
dummy equals 0 for the pre-reform period; that is, before 1994 and takes the value of 
one otherwise. The dummy variable is included in the estimated equation as a 
constant as well as interacting with each of the explanatory variables. In the former 
case, i.e.  t t t n t t i dummy c x c c c i ε ρ π + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − + 1 4 3 2 1  the dummy turns out to 
be statistically insignificant but its inclusion improves the fit of the policy rule. 
Alternatively, when the dummy is interacting with other terms, i.e. 
t t t n t t n t t i x dummy c dummy c dummy c x c c c i ε ρ π π + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − + + 1 6 5 4 3 2 1
just the term when the dummy variable is interacting with the inflation term becomes 
statistically significant.
 21 This result suggests not only the existence of some kind of 
structural break but also provides information of how effective has been the 
implementation of different strategies in reducing the levels of inflation (β value). 
Thus, the following ‘interest rate rule’ is estimated:
22  
 
t t t t t t r dummy x r ε ρ π δ ρ γ ρ π β ρ α ρ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + − = − + + + 1 3 2 3 95 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (  (11)
   
The results of this baseline equation are presented in the first row of table 1.
23 As 
mentioned before, β turns out to be a key parameter at the moment of assessing 
central bank’s response. In this case, the parameter β is positive and statistically 
greater than one.
 24 This result suggests that monetary policy in Mexico, through its 
effect on interest rate, has effectively stabilised the economy. The central bank does 
not accommodate inflationary pressures. Concerning the smoother parameter ρ, its 
high value suggests not only considerable interest rate inertia but also that the central 
bank is concerned about smoothing adjustments. In other words, a value about 0.80 
implies that the initial adjustment (same quarter) in the interest rate is only 20%. 
                                                 
20 A dummy variable for 1988 to account for the oil-price shock is also considered. Nevertheless just in 
few cases this is significant and the results do not improve considerably. 
21 Different specifications were carried out. In almost all of them the dummy both as a constant and 
interacting with the output gap turns out to be statistically insignificant.  
22 Although the Bank of Mexico does not directly determine interest rates, their behaviour is steered by 
the stance of monetary policy. Several authors assume short interest rates as the instrument of monetary 
policy although they embrace different monetary policy regimes. This is the case for example of Aron 
and Muellbauer, 2002; Corbo, 2002; Merha, 1999 and Clarida, et al., 1998. 
23 Two sets of instruments are considered. The first one includes one to four-period lags of the 
explanatory variables, in other words, of the inflation rate, interest rate and output gap. The second set 
of instruments adds to the first set, lagged information on the changes in the nominal exchange rate 
(depreciation rate) and monetary aggregates.  The results suggest a better fit of the policy rule when the 
second set of instruments is used.  
24 The Wald test is used to verify that the value of the parameter is statistically greater than one.   19
Parameter γ although has the expected sign is statistically no different from zero.
 25 
The value of the dummy variable turns out to be positive and statistically significant 
suggesting important changes in the structure of the economy as a consequence of the 
currency crisis. Its positive value also reinforces the role of monetary policy as a 
nominal anchor after 1995 when the monetary authorities made explicitly their 
commitment to price stability.    
 
Another way to evaluate the baseline monetary policy rule is to compare the estimated 
‘interest rate rule’ with actual interest rates. That is, to compare present values with 
those that would have been observed if during the sample period the interest rate had 
been determined by the estimated policy rule. Figure 3 shows the actual and simulated 
values for the interest rate. Overall, the monetary policy rule does a good job in 
following the direction of actual interest rates. In general the fitted values are above 
the current ones. In the post-reform period (after 1995) this pattern becomes clearer. 
These results can be interpreted as suggesting a more expansionary monetary policy 
than what it should have been if it had been determined in accordance with the 
proposed reaction function. Results from the baseline case suggest that monetary 
policy in Mexico has been consistent with the objective of achieving lower levels of 
inflation. The following section, however, considers the inclusion of other variables as 
additional objectives in the central bank’s reaction function which may describe better 
how interest rates are determined in Mexico.  
 
Augmented monetary policy rules for Mexico 
 
An augmented monetary policy rule is used to test the role of macroeconomic 
variables other than inflation and output. For this purpose, the following equation is 
estimated:  
 
t t t t t t t r z d x r ε ρ ϕ ρ π δ ρ γ ρ π β ρ α ρ + ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + − = − + + + 1 3 2 3 ) 1 ( 95 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (      (12) 
 
                                                 
25 Torres, A. (2002) and Martinez, Sanchez and Werner (2001) found similar results. Their sample 
period however is shorter starting in 1996. 
   20
where zt represents any variable, other than inflation and output that may influence 








The backward-looking component of monetary policy 
 
To check whether interest rate are determined more in a forward-looking than 
backward-looking manner the augmented interest rate rule is estimated defining zt as 
the observed lagged inflation ( 1 − t π ). If interest rates are determined in a relatively 
backward-looking model the nominal interest rate would be expected to rise enough 
to increase the real interest rate (φ>1) rather than when inflation is generated in a 
forward-looking form. The results presented in table 1 suggest that there is a 
significant contribution of the lagged value of inflation in the determination of interest 
rates in Mexico although this is not good enough to stabilise the economy (φ<1). The 
same performance is observed with the value of the parameter β. In other words, β 
becomes significantly less than one suggesting that the response from the authorities 
to inflation shocks is not sufficient to stabilise the economy. Finally, the significant 
decrease in the value of parameter β once the lagged value of inflation is included in 
the estimation suggests either high persistence of inflation or that part of the 
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Money and the exchange rate 
 
Following Taylor (2001), the interest rate reaction function estimated includes the 
change in the nominal exchange rate where an increase means depreciation and vice 
versa.
 26 Results reported in table 1 indicate that parameter φ is positive and 
statistically different from zero. However, β is both statistically no different from zero 
and no longer greater than one. Parameter γ remains insignificant. It seems that part of 
the information enclosed in this variable is also incorporated in the observed inflation 
and output gap. This in an interesting result in the context of a floating exchange rate 
regime where the central bank seems to react to effectively maintain price stability 
rather than to maintain a specific level of the exchange rate.  
   
Table 1. 
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1 The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistic values, except in the J-test column where they represent the ‘p’ value to reject the 
hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions hold.  
* Statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
^ Statistically significant at 90% confidence level 
 
The money supply, alternatively, is added to the regressors of the baseline equation. 
In this case zt is defined as the annual variation of the sum of money and quasi money 
                                                 
26 Taylor (2001) assumes that central banks respond to the level rather than to the change of the 
nominal interest rate.    22
(first log difference).
 27 The results show that the parameter φ turns out to be negative. 
This is contrary to what one would expect since higher money supply growth should 
motivate an increase in the interest rate in order to prevent inflation from rising.  
 
Current account, foreign reserves and lending boom indicator 
 
After several attempts to reduce inflation to stable rates, Mexico has eventually 
achieved this goal even experiencing profound economic crises. So, in particular, this 
section investigates if the central bank behaviour has changed and if it is valuable to 
consider prevention variables in its policy reaction function. The results of the 
augmented monetary policy rule are presented in the second part of table 1.  As in the 
baseline case, parameter β is statistically larger than one and parameter γ remains 
statistically no different from zero. Regarding the lending boom indicator, this seems 
not to contribute at the time the central bank has to make a decision concerning its 
monetary policy position. Nonetheless this is not the case for the change in foreign 
reserves and the current account deficit although both coefficients present unexpected 
signs.  
 
4.1.2 Gap model  
 
An alternative version of the baseline model is estimated where actual values of the 
explanatory variables are replaced by their deviations from trend values (gap model). 
In this respect the Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to measure the trend values. This is 
mainly because of the short experienced with a fully-fledged IT system and therefore 
with the lack of sufficient data for the announced inflation targets. 
28 In addition, it is 
important to note that the inflation target is not considered to be constant over time as 
in Clarida et al. (1998). This value could be time-variant for a country that has an 
objective to reduce inflation, gradually, towards industrial country levels. Poor results 
however are obtained from these estimations where parameters become statistically 
insignificant and with the wrong signs. These results may be because of the high 
instability observed in the main variables at the beginning of the 80s. To address this 
issue the gap model is reestimated for a shorter period of time (1988-2002). The 
                                                 
27 Including the quarterly change in the estimation of this variable does not alter the results.  
28 The sample period under estimation is longer than the one under this monetary policy framework.   23
results presented in table 2 in general support the previous findings. Parameter β is 
always greater than one and statistically significant suggesting the commitment of the 
monetary authorities to stabilise the economy even before its transition to a fully-
fledged IT. Two exceptions are when the depreciation rate and the lending boom 
indicator are added suggesting that these variables contain information already given 
in the main variables. In all the augmented policy rules the signs of all estimated 
parameters are the expected ones and statistically significant. Parameter ρ decreases in 
this sample period suggesting that approximately half of the initial adjustment is 


































1 The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistic values, except in the J-test column where they represent the ‘p’ value to reject the 
hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions hold.  
* Statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
^ Statistically significant at 90% confidence level 
 
 
4.1.3 The role of inflation expectations 
 
 
The existence of reliable data on market-based inflation expectations is very useful in 
an inflation-targeting context. However, as Bernanke and Woodford (1997) indicate 
key limitations of market-based inflation expectations need to be considered. 
Specifically, measured inflation expectations are backward looking and reflect 
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adaptive behaviour by the public. Therefore, a variable that in principle should 
contain a strong forward-looking element is largely determined by past performance. 
Furthermore, in a regime where the authorities conduct inflation forecast targeting 
based on market-based inflation expectations as one of the key indicators, and where 
there has been a gradual learning about the anti inflation process stance of the 
authorities, it is very difficult to determine the properties of market based inflation 
expectations. Taking into account these difficulties, a third specification is estimated 
using expected rather than actual values for the inflation rate. This policy rule 
however includes just the sample period in which this data is available (1996-2002). 
The data on inflation expectations is obtained from the Central Bank of Mexico. 
Consequently, the inflation gap is calculated as the difference between inflation 
expectations at the end of the year and the value of the inflation target announced by 
the central bank.   
 
The results shown in table 3 are quite remarkable. All the coefficients are statistically 
significance at the 5% level of significance and with the expected values. Parameter β 
continues above unity suggesting that Bank of Mexico has been concerned with 
inflation stabilization. The coefficient of the output gap for this sample period (1996-
2002) turns out to be statistically significant and with the expected value in all the 
estimations. The monetary authorities seem to be concerned with output fluctuations. 
In particular, the results imply that the authorities increased interest rates when a rise 
in the gap between real GDP and its trend is expected. The smoothing parameter 
however decreases substantially in this period. On average almost 90 percent of the 
adjustment is achieved in the first quarter. This may reflect the gains in terms of 
policy credibility which makes the monetary policy stance more effective. Similar 
conclusions can be found in Chuecos (2003) and Torres (2002).  Overall, the results 
suggest that monetary policy in Mexico has been consistent with IT principles. 
Moreover, the results from the inclusion of additional variables in the interest rate rule 
reflect the concern by the monetary authorities in aspects related to financial stability. 
Marginal and positive contributions are observed in all variables being the most 
significant the one from the lending boom indicator. The value of the parameter when 
changes in the nominal exchange rate are included becomes quite small. This suggests 
that a flexible exchange rate has indeed contributed to reduce inflation. In the   25
backward-looking estimation, the parameter φ is statistically insignificant. This 
implies that setting interest rates in Mexico is more forward than backward-looking. 
 
Overall, the evidence presented shows that Bank of Mexico has been acting according 
to IT principles where monetary policy has performed the role of the nominal anchor 
of the economy. This performance becomes clearer when inflation expectations are 
included in the estimations. In this case not only inflation deviations from its target 
but also output deviations from its trend are considered. Finally, the inclusion of 
additional variables seems to contribute to the process through interest rate are 
determined in Mexico. As expected the addition of the depreciation rate is significant 
when the period under an exchange rate regime is included. However its contribution 
decreases significantly at the time a flexible exchange rate policy is in place.     
 
Table 3. 
Forward-looking model : 
 Baseline and augmented policy rule 
1 






























1 The inflation gap is calculated as the difference between inflation expectations at the end of the year and the inflation target 
announced by the central bank. 
The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistic values, except in the J-test column where they represent the ‘p’ value to reject the 
hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions hold.  
* Statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
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4.2 The case of Israel 
 
4.2.1 Baseline specification 
 
Following the same procedure as in the case of Mexico, a monetary policy rule is 
estimated using quarterly data for the period 1986:Q1-2001Q4. So, the ‘interest rate 
rule’ is given by: 
 
t t t t t r x r ε ρ γ ρ π β ρ α ρ + ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + − = − + + 1 2 3 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (                                      (13) 
 
The results of this estimation using a three-quarter lead for the inflation are shown at 
the top of table 4a.
 29  The coefficient associated to inflation is positive but less than 
one suggesting that monetary authorities are not particularly determined to control 
inflation shocks. The estimated parameter of the partial adjustment process for interest 
rates seems to be particularly high suggesting concern about smoothing adjustments 




To evaluate the estimated monetary policy rule dynamic simulations are carried out. 
In other words, current values of the interest rate are compared with those that would 
have been observed if the interest rate had been determined by the estimated policy 
rule. Figure 6 depicts the actual and simulated values for the interest rate. In general 
the ‘interest rate rule’ follows the direction of actual rates. Nevertheless around 1994 
the fitted values are always below the current ones. These results can be interpreted as 
having a more contractionary monetary policy than what it could have been if it had 
been determined in accordance to the suggested reaction function.  
 
 
                                                 
29 The estimation considers as an instrumental variables lag values (up to four) of the explanatory 
variables and of the depreciation rate, export growth and a measure of money growth. According to 
Mohanty and Klau, 2004 this set of instrumental variables are suitable for emerging economies.  
30 It is worth mentioning that a dummy variable is taken into account in the specification at the time 
Israel decided to adopt a crawling exchange rate band along with the implementation of inflation 
targets. The dummy equals 0 for the pre-reform period; that is, before 1992 and takes the value of one 
otherwise. As in the case of Mexico both intercept and slope dummies are used. In none of the cases, 
however, the estimated parameter turns out to be statistically significant. These results suggest the 
absence of significant changes affecting the structure of the Israeli economy at that time.   27
Figure 6. 




Augmented monetary policy rules for Israel 
 
As in the case of Mexico an augmented monetary policy rule is estimated:  
 
t t t t t t r z x r ε ρ ϕ ρ γ ρ π β ρ α ρ + ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + − = − + + 1 2 3 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (                (14) 
 
where zt represents any variable, other than inflation and output that may influence 
the process through which interest rate is determined.  
 
The backward-looking component of monetary policy 
 
Disinflation in Israel has been a relatively slow process. It took more than a decade 
for the rate of inflation to fall from about 18 percent per year in the late 1980s to less 
than 4 percent per year in the late 1990s.  Over time the central bank has placed more 
credibility regarding inflation as the key objective of monetary policy. In this context 
and prior to testing the role of additional variables the interest rate rule is estimated 
using observed lagged inflation. The results presented in the first row of table 4a 
suggest a significant contribution of the lagged value of inflation in the determination 
of interest rates in Israel during this sample period. All variables are statistically 
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associated with the backward-looking component suggest that there is a significant 
contribution of the lagged value on inflation even though this value is significantly 
less than one as in the case of the forward-looking component (β).  The coefficient of 
the output gap suggests that during this period, the monetary authorities gave some 
weight to economic fluctuations. In particular, the results imply that the authorities 
increased interest rates when a rise in the gap between real GDP and its trend was 
expected. Finally the smoothing parameter ρ implies that for a given change in the 
interest rate the proportion reflected in the rate in the same quarter is about 30% of the 
change.  The above results do not suggest the presence of a monetary policy with an 
institutional commitment to achieve low and stables rates of inflation. The monetary 
authorities seem to accommodate shocks rather than to stabilise the economy. To 
explore further this issue the following sections consider additional variables in the 
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1 The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistic values, except in the J-test column where they represent the ‘p’ value to reject the 
hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions hold.  
2 The value of the parameter for the inclusion of money and the depreciation rate are the ones for φ1 and φ2 respectively. 
* Statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
^ Statistically significant at 90% confidence level 
 
Money and the exchange rate 
 
In this section the inclusion of money and the exchange rate is tested in the 
augmented policy rule. In the former case, the variable zt in the augmented interest   29
rate rule is defined as the quarterly variation (first log difference) of the monetary 
base (∆mt).
 31  Theoretically, the rate at which m expands should be in line with that of 
nominal GDP growth, i.e., expected or potential real GDP plus the inflation target. 
Thus if this aggregate expands too rapidly it implies upward pressure on the future 
inflation rate, so that the future inflation rate may overshoot the target and therefore 
an increase in the interest rate is expected. As in the baseline model the parameter β is 
statistically less than one and the parameter γ is positive but statistically not 
significant. Parameter φ is positive and statistically different from zero at the 10 
percent level of significance (See table 4a). Similarly, in the second case, zt is 
computed as the quarterly variation of the nominal exchange rate expressed in NIS 
per dollar (∆ert). An increase means depreciation and vice versa. As discussed, 
inflation targets in Israel coexist with another nominal policy commitment, namely 
the crawling exchange rate band for the NIS (new Israeli shekel) against a basket of 
foreign currencies. This issue makes particularly interesting the evaluation of the role 
of the exchange rate in this country where the authorities have underline its priority to 
price stability in case of conflict.
 32 The results presented in table 4a (case 1) suggest 
that monetary authorities increase rates when the exchange rate depreciates. 
Differently from the case of Mexico, not just the current but also lagged values of the 
change in the nominal exchange rate are considered in the augmented policy rule:  
 
t t t t t t t r z z x r ε ρ ϕ ρ ϕ ρ γ ρ π β ρ α ρ + ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + − = − − + + 1 1 2 1 2 3 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (      (15) 
 
If shocks to the exchange rate are large and persistent and the central bank places a 
higher weight on exchange rate stability we would expect significant positive 
coefficients on both current and lagged values of the depreciation rate. The results 
presented in table 4a provide evidence on central bank reaction to exchange rate 
movements. They indicate a high degree of persistence of exchange rate shocks in this 
country. Furthermore it seems that the interest rate response to the exchange rate 
exceeds that for the inflation rate. In both cases, the parameter φ is statistically 
                                                 
31 Empirical studies undertaken in the Bank of Israel (Weitzman Nagar, Bank of Israel) have shown 
that in the case of Israel the M1 monetary aggregate  (cash in the hands of the public and current 
accounts) is a better predictor of the development of inflation in the future than other monetary and 
credit aggregates.   
32 In fact, since mid 1997 there has been a gradual widening of the currency band, which has been 
considered as having a floating exchange regime (within the confines of the band).     30
different from zero and positive. This result shows that both variables have a positive 
effect on the determination of interest rates in Israel. A third specification of the 
augmented monetary policy rule combines money and the exchange rate as variables 
z1t  and  z2t respectively. Results in the last row of table 4a confirm previous findings, 
particularly regarding the value of β, which remains statistically less than one.  
 
Current account, foreign reserves and lending boom indicator 
 
As in the case of Mexico, three more variables are considered as potential indicators 
for external crisis: foreign reserves, a lending boom indicator and the current account 
deficit. The inclusion of these variables in the objective function of a central bank is 
expected to influence notably the formulation of monetary policy. Results reported in 
table 4b show that with the exception of the lending boom indicator the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant and with the expected signs. Parameter β 
remains statistically less than one suggesting either that the authorities just 
accommodate expected shocks to inflation or the presence of secondary objectives 
besides the achievement of a gradual reduction of inflation. Regarding the interest rate 
smoothing coefficient this reflects a high degree of persistence where actual interest 
rate adjusts relatively slowly. On average eighty percent of the level of the short-term 
interest rate is explained by its lagged value. The dynamic augmented policy rules 
presented in fig. 4 seem to follow the direction of actual interest rates. However, the 
performance is quite similar to the one observed from the baseline equation. These 
results suggest that the inclusion of the above variables may not be a better 
approximation than the baseline specification to how interest rates are determined by 
the monetary authorities in Israel.   
 
In order to look for any possible change in the way monetary policy is performed after 
the adoption of inflation targets, the baseline equation for the sample period 1992Q1-
2001Q4 is estimated. The results are shown in table 5. As in the case of the whole 
period, estimations for the baseline equation, backward-looking specification and 
augmented monetary policy rules are presented. All variables are statistically 
significant at the one-percent level and have the expected signs. The coefficient 
associated to inflation is in all cases significantly less than one, suggesting that the 
authorities, during this period, tended to accommodate expected shocks to inflation.   31
On average, the value of parameter β is smaller in comparison with the one in the 
whole sample period. The partial adjustment coefficient also shows that during this 
period the movements of the short interest rate are less persistent than in the whole 
period. On average almost sixty percent of the desired adjustment in the observed 
interest rates is obtained in one quarter. Regarding the coefficient of the output gap 
this is statistically different from zero in all cases. This finding suggests a significant 
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1 The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistic values, except in the J-test column where they represent the ‘p’ value to reject the 
hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions hold.  
* Statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
^ Statistically significant at 90% confidence level 
 
4.2.2 Gap Model 
 
An alternative version of the baseline model is estimated where actual values of the 
explanatory variables are replaced by their deviations from trend values. The Hodrick-
Prescott filter is used to measure the trend values as in the case of Mexico. The results 
using a two-quarter lead for the inflation gap are presented in table 6. Certain remarks 
should be made. Replacing the values from the baseline model by their respective 
deviations from trend values does not significantly improve the fit. Moreover the 
degree of interest rate smoothing remains particularly high. This finding reflects the 
concern of the authorities to adjust interest rates by small steps. On average ninety 
percent of the level of the short-term interest rate is explained by its lagged value. 
Concerning the values of parameters β and γ, however, different conclusions can be 
drawn. The value of the parameter β turns out to be statistically significant and greater 
than one while in most of the cases the parameter associated to the output gap has the 
unexpected sign and it is statistically insignificant. These results suggest that the 
central bank in Israel does not accommodate inflation pressures as it was suggested in 
the previous estimations. It seems that monetary policy has effectively stabilised the 
economy. In so far output stabilisation is concerned, the evidence is mixed. The 
baseline model suggests that in some cases monetary authorities gave some weight to 
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economic fluctuations whereas the gap model suggests that this is not the case. 
Regarding the results from the augmented policy rules, the signs of all estimated 
parameters are the expected ones and statistically significant. The only exception is 
when the current account deficit is considered.  
 
Table 6. 































1 The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistic values, except in the J-test column where they represent the ‘p’ value to reject the 
hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions hold.  
* Statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
^ Statistically significant at 90% confidence level 
 
4.2.3 Inflation Targeting in Israel 
 
To explore in more detail the previous results a third specification is considered.   
Expected rather than actual values for the inflation rate are used. In the case of Israel, 
the existence of market-based inflations expectations is available since 1992. In this 
sense the opportunity of comparing the results obtained from previous specifications 
is possible. Consequently, the inflation gap is calculated as the difference between 
expected inflation and the inflation target for the following four quarters. The results 
for the baseline equation, backward-looking specification and augmented monetary 
policy rules are presented in table 7. It is important to note that the forward-looking 
policy function confirms most findings of the gap model. Parameter β continues 
  α  β  γ  φ1  ρ  J-test 
Baseline 
  ) 02 . 9 (
* 45 . 11  
) 37 . 3 (
* 72 . 2  
) 45 . 3 (






) 5 . 180 (
* 90 . 0  
) 86 . 0 (




) 57 . 4 (
* 97 . 9  
) 98 . 7 (
* 08 . 9  
) 22 . 0 (
41 . 15  
) 38 . 4 (
* 81 . 1  
) 1 . 121 (
* 92 . 0  
) 87 . 0 (





) 54 . 1 (
39 . 4  
) 63 . 5 (
* 55 . 7  
) 61 . 0 ( 48 . 34  
) 66 . 4 (
* 62 . 0  
) 07 . 61 (
* 88 . 0  
) 91 . 0 (




) 09 . 5 (
* 52 . 10  
) 75 . 5 (
* 58 . 3  
) 41 . 4 (
* 29 . 26
− −
 
) 02 . 0 (
003 . 0  
) 53 . 124 (
* 91 . 0  
) 80 . 0 (




) 54 . 9 (
* . 82 . 10  
) 73 . 3 (
* 14 . 2  
) 25 . 3 (
* 2 . 199
− −
 
) 94 . 1 (
^ 07 . 0  
) 41 . 165 (
* 90 . 0  
) 92 . 0 (





) 83 . 2 (
* 34 . 4  
) 68 . 9 (
* 23 . 5  
) 0 . 4 (
* 9 . 262  
) 54 . 12 (
* 9 . 406
 
) 2 . 125 (
* 87 . 0  
) 88 . 0 (




) 92 . 7 (
* 50 . 8  
) 57 . 9 (
* 35 . 5  
) 02 . 2 (
* 2 . 113
− −
 
) 83 . 4 (
* 02 . 0
− −  
) 1 . 200 (
* 91 . 0  
) 96 . 0 (
81 . 10    34
above unity suggesting that Bank of Israel has been concerned with inflation 
stabilization. The coefficient of the output gap becomes significant and with the 
correct sign just when the lending-boom indicator is included in the estimation. The 
smoothing parameter decreases slightly in this period. On average 30 percent of the 
adjustment is achieved in the first quarter. The results from the inclusion of additional 
variables in the interest rate rule reflect the concern by the monetary authorities in 
aspects related to financial stability. Positive contributions are observed in all 
variables being the most significant the one from the lending boom indicator. 
Exceptions are the cases when the depreciation and the current account deficit are 
included. Notable are the results in the backward-looking estimation. Parameter φ is 
statistically significant and greater than one suggesting a significant contribution of 
the lagged value of inflation in the determination of interest rates in Israel. This 
finding does not support the idea of having a strong effect of forward-looking 
inflation expectations under an IT regime.   
 
Table 7. 
Forward-looking model :  
































1 The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistic values, except in the J-test column where they represent the ‘p’ value to reject the 
hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions hold.  
* Statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
^ Statistically significant at 90% confidence level 
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4.3 Comparison of the results  
 
The evidence presented from the estimation of policy rules in terms of forward-
looking rules can be analysed in terms of the three suggested alternative specifications 
and according to the set of variables proposed as an additional indicators to the basic 
specification. Overall, the evidence presented shows that Bank of Mexico has been 
acting according to IT principles where monetary policy has performed the role of the 
nominal anchor of the economy. This performance becomes clearer when inflation 
expectations are included in the estimations. In this case not only inflation deviations 
from its target but also output deviations from its trend are considered at the time 
interest rates are set. The Bank of Israel, on the other hand, does not seem to have a 
clear commitment to stabilise inflation when the rate of inflation rather than its 
deviation from some trend/target value is used. In other words, the respond in nominal 
interest rates is not sufficient to induce the real interest rate to rise to stabilise the 
economy. This is no the case however when output deviations from its trend take 
place. The results suggest that the monetary authorities gave some weight to 
economic fluctuations especially after the announcement of a crawling exchange rate 
band at the end of 1991. In contrast, when the results from both the gap and the 
forward-looking specifications are considered some sign reversals are observed. The 
value of the parameter β turns out to be statistically significant and greater than one 
while in most of the cases the parameter associated to the output gap has the 
unexpected sign and it is statistically insignificant. These findings suggest that the 
central bank in Israel has effectively stabilised the economy rather than just 
accommodate inflation pressures when deviations of inflation from its trend or its 
target value are perceived.  
 
Concerning the smoother parameter ρ, this remains practically the same in all 
specifications for the case of Israel. Its high value suggests not only considerable 
interest rate inertia but also that the central bank is concerned about smoothing 
adjustments. Its value decreases slightly when estimations are carried out from 1992 
onwards. In the case of Mexico, the shorter the sample period, the lower the estimated 
parameter of the partial adjustment process for interest rates. This may reflect the 
gains in terms of policy credibility which makes the monetary policy stance more 
effective. Backward-looking component   36
 
The inclusion of the change in the nominal exchange rate in the interest rate reaction 
function is particular interesting in this study due to different stance in each country 
regarding this issue. In the case of Mexico, this coefficient is always with the 
expected sign and statistically different from zero. However, its inclusion changes 
significantly the size of the β coefficient which seems to indicate that part of the 
information enclosed in the former variable is already incorporated in the inflation 
and output gap. In the forward-looking model, its value is marginally significant and 
parameter β continues statistically greater than one. This is a remarkable result in the 
context of a floating exchange rate where the central bank seems to react to 
effectively maintain price stability instead to defend a specific level of the exchange 
rate. In Israel the results are mixed. Using the inflation rate in the estimations the 
results indicate not only that the central bank reacts to changes in the exchange rate 
but also that this response exceeds that from the inflation rate. This finding however is 
not clear in the forward-looking specification where the coefficient of the exchange 
rate becomes insignificant. On the whole, the contribution of the depreciation rate 
decreases significantly at the time a more flexible exchange rate policy is in place.     
 
The inclusion of additional variables in the policy rule seems to contribute to the 
process through which interest rates are determined in Israel and Mexico. Similar 
conclusions can be drawn from the experience of both countries regarding the 
lending-boom indicator. While this is not significant in the baseline model its 
contribution becomes considerable either in the gap and the forward-looking 
specifications. Similar performance is observed considering the foreign reserves. 
Concerning the value of the parameter when the current account deficit is taken into 
account this is insignificant in most of the cases or with the unexpected sign. Finally, 
interest rates in Mexico appear to respond more in a forward than in a backward–
looking manner particularly after 1995 when most of the requirements to adopt IT 
were put into practice. In Israel a significant contribution of the lagged value of 
inflation is observed.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
This study analyses the main determinants of monetary policy in two emerging 
economies: Mexico and Israel. To address this issue interest rate reaction functions of 
the form introduced by Taylor (1993) and extended by Clarida et al. (1998), in terms 
of forward-looking rules, are estimated. The analysis identifies a set of variables that, 
combined with the basic specification offer a good approximation to the process 
through which interest rates are determined. It is important to note however that 
although optimal reactions functions are estimated, these are not necessarily the best 
policy for day-to-day policy-making. Setting interest rates resemble a rule-like 
behaviour and any model, by definition, is an incomplete description of reality.  
 
In Mexico, the evidence presented shows that monetary policy has performed the role 
of the nominal anchor of the economy (β>1). This implies a central bank stabilising 
the economy when inflationary pressures are identified rather than just 
accommodating them. The results are more evident after the implementation of IT.  In 
addition an augmented monetary policy rule that includes not only inflation and the 
output gap but also variables such as foreign reserves or a lending-boom indicator 
offer a good approximation to the process through which interest rates are determined 
in this country. The inclusion of these variables may be a good indicator for external 
disturbances. The case of Mexico suggests that even with a flexible exchange rate 
regime it is feasible to reduce inflation when an appropriate monetary policy is 
adopted. In the case of Israel, the evidence presented regarding the stance of monetary 
policy is not as clear as in the case of Mexico. The coexistence of a crawling 
exchange rate band with the adoption of inflation targeting principles seems to make 
the conduct of monetary policy more challenging than otherwise. On the whole, the 
results indicate high degree of persistence of exchange rate shocks in this country 
although a decrease is observed at the time a more flexible exchange rate policy is in 
place. In addition a significant contribution of the lagged value of inflation in the 
determination of interest rates is found. As in the case of Mexico, the inclusion of 
additional variables in the monetary policy rule seems to be a good indicator for 
external disturbances. Overall, it can be said that although both countries have 
achieved lower and more stable levels of inflation, the exchange rate policy adopted 
in each country seems to play an important role in this process.    38
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Distinguishing features  Author(s)  Method 
 






Clarida, et. al.  (1998,2000) 
Mehra (1999) 
Leiderman & Bar-Or (2000) 
Torres (2002) 
 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
Nominal exchange rate 
 
Taylor (2001) 
Aron and Muellbauer (2002) 
Torres (2002) 
 
Unemployment rate  Clarida, et. al.  (1998) 
Corbo (2002) 
Eleftheriou (2003) 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
Money supply  Clarida, et. al.  (1998) 
Mehra (1999) 
Torres (2002) 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
Real exchange rate  Kamin & Rogers (1996) 




Mohanty & Klau (2003) 
 
Foreign interest rates  Taylor (1993) 
Clarida, et. al.  (1998) 










Aron and Muellbauer (2002) 
Corbo (2002) 
Medina & Vales (2002) 
 
 
II. Forward-looking rules 
 
Taylor (1993) 
Clarida, et. al.  (1998, 2000) 
Mehra (1999) 
Leiderman & Bar-Or (2000) 




Mohanty & Klau (2003) 
 
 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
(*) Most of the studies are base on the rule proposed by Taylor (1993). 




Results of Unit Root Tests 
Case of Mexico 
 
                   ADF Test 
a           
                       Variables                Number of lags         ADF statistic    
 
 
IR^              0           -2.872      I(1)   
INF           5          -3.592             I(0)  
GAP           4        -4.907      I(0) 
DEP           0           -6.801        I(0) 
MG           2           -7.042        I(0)   
FA           0           -6.433        I(0)   
    FDI             0           -7.255        I(0) 
      CA                1           -7.163        I(0) 
 
 
The null hypothesis is that the series is I(1).  
(a) The critical values for rejection are –3.467 at a significant level of 5% for models with a linear trend and constant.  
(^) Applying the unit root test for short samples there is strong evidence of stationarity. 







Results of Unit Root Tests 
Case of Israel  
 
                 ADF Test 
a           
                       Variables                Number of lags         ADF statistic    
 
 
IR              0
c           -4.601      I(0)   
INF           1
c           -8.662             I(0)  
GAP           0
c           -4.867      I(0) 
DEP           0
c           -8.201        I(0) 
MG           2
c           -8.849        I(0)   
FA           0
c           -6.519        I(0)   
    FDI             0
c           -9.312      I(0) 
      CA                0
c           -6.326      I(0) 
 
 
The null hypothesis is that the series is I(1).  
(a) The critical values for rejection are –3.497 at a significant level of 5% for models with a linear trend and constant.  
All variables are computed in growth rates except for the interest rate. 
 
 
 